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INTRODUCTION
Given the importance of access to medicines to human rights and wellbeing in Kenya, it is appropriate to analyze whether Kenya has currently
incorporated the allowed public health flexibilities to the greatest extent
possible in its draft Intellectual Property Bill, 2020.2 This analysis will focus
on the patent, utility model, and enforcement measures only as they are the
ones directly relevant to access to medicines and other health technologies.
The analysis starts with the premise that Kenya wishes to avoid granting
unwarranted patents on unworthy inventions, especially with respect to
medicines and other health technologies. In particular, the assumption is that
Kenya wishes to avoid granting secondary patents or minor variations to
known medicines and medical technologies which have the sole effect of
extending patent monopolies and preventing local generic production or
importation. It is assumed that Kenya wants to have a patent regime that
prevents granting patents on new medical uses of medicines and on new
formulation and dosages. In a word, the analysis assumes that Kenya wants
to avoid evergreening. It assumes instead that Kenya wants to maximize
TRIPS-compliant policy space to minimize unneeded patent barriers and
* Northeastern University School of Law; Honorary Research Fellow University of KwaZulu Natal
(South Africa); Senior Policy Analyst, Health Global Access Project.
2 The Kenyan Parliament revised its Industrial Property Act in 2001 and it came into force in May
2002. The Act has subsequently been amended in 2002 (Act No. 2 of 2002) and 2007 (Act No. 7 of
2007).
The
Act
is
available
at:
http://www.kenyalaw.org:8181/exist/kenyalex/actview.xql?actid=CAP.%20509. Kenya has now
proposed to recodify its intellectual property law in a single bill, the Intellectual Property Bill, 2020,
https://www.kipi.go.ke/images/docs/IPOK%20Bill%202020.pdf.
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further to bypass patents to advance its public health and public interest
needs. Finally it assumes that Kenya further desires to expand policy space
that would allow growth of domestic and regional pharmaceutical capacity.
In crafting these recommendations, the author has relied extensively on
EAC3 and COMESA4 recommendations that adoption and use of TRIPSflexibilities be maximized, on academic and think-tank commentary, and on
best practices from countries that have adopted and successfully used TRIPS
flexibilities.5 The paper also draws on the positive example of India, which
has adopted the vast majority of recommended TRIPS-compliant public
health flexibilities.
In sum, there are many positives in the proposed Kenyan Intellectual
Property Bill, 2020, that have at least partially incorporated desired
flexibilities but there are important gaps and omissions as well. On the plus
side, the Bill incorporates several important TRIPS public-health flexibilities,
including parallel importation and the right to issue government use and
compulsory licenses. The Bill also incorporates a research exception and
promotes close regulation of anti-competitive provisions in voluntary
licenses. Also on the plus side, the Bill has updated the 2001 Act to adopt

East African Community, REGIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY POLICY ON THE UTILIZATION OF PUBLIC
HEALTH-RELATED WTO-TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES AND THE APPROXIMATION OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LEGISLATION (2013) [EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY].
4 COMESA, Recommendations of the Workshop on Public Health and Access to Life-saving
medicine in COMESA held on 1-5 March 2011 at Imperial Royale Hotel, Kampala, Uganda
http://www.comesabusinesscouncil.org/attachments/article/27/Annex%20XVII%20Recommendations%20of%20the%20TRIPS%20workshop,%2014%20March,%202011.pdf:
TRIPS Flexibilities
1. COMESA Secretariat in collaboration with other relevant organizations to assist
Member States to implement the COMESA IPR Policy by developing/updating national
IPR policies, laws and regulations by taking into account the use of flexibilities provided
for in the TRIPS Agreement.
2. COMESA LDCs and WTO Members to use the flexibilities in the TRIPS Agreement by
ensuring investment promotion and protection for local production of pharmaceuticals.
3. COMESA Member States that are negotiating accession to the WTO to ensure that they
benefit from the TRIPS flexibilities on Public Health and access to life-saving medicines
available to existing Members of the WTO in their category. COMESA Member States
that are already Members of the WTO to support those applying for accession.
4. Member States to support the extension of the period of TRIPS flexibilities as long as
production in the region remains at low levels and does not meet the demand of the
majority of the population.
5 This analysis is informed by UNDP, GOOD PRACTICE GUIDE: IMPROVING ACCESS TO TREATMENT BY
UTILIZING PUBLIC HEALTH FLEXIBILITIES IN THE WTO TRIPS AGREEMENT (2010) (UNDP GOOD
PRACTICE GUIDE); UNDP, USING LAW TO ACCELERATE TREATMENT ACCESS IN SOUTH AFRICA: AN
ANALYSIS OF PATENT, COMPETITION, AND MEDICINES LAW (2013) [UNDP SA REVIEW]; Carlos Correa,
INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH CONCERNS INTO PATENT LEGISLATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (2000)
(Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH); Carlos Correa, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF
PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS: DEVELOPING A PUBLIC HEALTH PERSPECTIVE, WHO-ICTSC-UNCTAD
(2007) (Correa, GUIDELINES FOR EXAMINATION); Carlos Correa, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND
COMPETITION LAW: EXPLORING SOME ISSUES OF RELEVANCE TO DEVELOPING Countries (2007) (Correa,
IP AND COMPETITION LAW; Carlos M. Correa, PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, INCREMENTAL PATENTING
AND COMPULSORY LICENSING, SOUTH CENTRE RESEARCH PAPER 41 (2011) (Correa, PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION); and on legislation and regulations from India, the Philippines, Argentina, and Zanzibar.
3
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more rigorous standards of patentability and disclosure, including additional
exclusions from patentability for new methods of using and new uses of
existing medicines and required disclosures to include the best method for
practicing the invention. However, the proposed Bill could still include even
higher standards of patentability, more exceptions to exclusive patent rights,
and strong pre- and post-grant opposition procedures. It could also make it
easier to issue government use and compulsory licenses and broaden even
further the grounds for doing. Finally, it should also ensure that utility
models do not cover medicines or other medical technologies.
ANALYSIS OF KEY PROVISIONS
I.

Exclusions from patentability

Article 47 of the Bill describes the meaning of inventions and excludes
certain subject matter as non-patentable. Although Article 47 does not
exclude patents on plants and animals, Article 52(a) does: “The following
shall not be patentable: (a) plant varieties as provided for in the Seeds and
Plant Varieties Act (Cap. 326), but not parts thereof or products of
biotechnological process… .” Unfortunately this exclusion is incomplete in
terms of what is permitted by Article 27.1 of the TRIPS Agreement in that it
allows patents on animals and parts of plants, including presumably seeds,
and it fails to exclude patents on genes and other isolates of naturally
occurring substances. This later omission could block access to some genebased medical technologies, particularly certain forms of diagnostic testing;
it could also block access to medicines extracted from or duplicating naturally
occurring substances. The EAC recommends that there be an explicit
exclusion for “Natural substances including micro-organisms, even if
purified or otherwise isolated from nature.”6
Proposed Article 47(3)(e) is a very aggressive provision excluding patent
protection for “public health related methods of use or uses of any molecule
or other substances whatsoever used for the prevention or treatment of any
disease which the Cabinet Secretary responsibility for matters relating to
Health may designate as a serious health hazard or as a life-threatening
disease.” This important provision allows the Minister of Health to exclude
patents on methods of use or uses of certain medicines entirely from patent
protection on compelling public health grounds. Some authors have
strenuously defended the TRIPS-compatibility of this provision.7
In addition to this exclusion, Kenya could make use of other public health
exclusions like the ones used in Section 3(d) of the India Patents Act, “the

EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(a)(i), at 13.
Robert Lewis-Lettington & Peter Munyi, WILLINGNESS AND ABILITY TO USE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES:
KENYA CASE STUDY, DFID:
Health Systems Resource Centre Issues Paper (2004),
http://www.who.int/hiv/amds/countries/ken_UseTRIPsFlexibilitiesDFID.pdf.
6
7
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mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does not result
in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance or the mere
discovery of any new property or new use for a known substance or the
mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus unless such known
process results in a new product or employs at least one new reactant” is not
an invention. With respect to the new-form exclusion, Indian Supreme Court
has interpreted enhanced efficacy to require proof of significantly increased
therapeutic efficacy not simply better physical property or even increased
bioavailability alone.8 The EAC has recommended adoption of this
exclusion.9 Kenya could also adopt India-style exclusions on combinations
and admixtures of know substances (see section 3(e) of the India Patents Act).
II.

Standards of patentability

Article 48 defines standards of patentability in TRIPS-standard terms “An
invention is patentable if it is new, involves and inventive step, is industrially
applicable” but fortunately drops ill-advised patents on “new uses”, a
provision in the 2001 Act as amended. Granting patents on new uses of
medicines is highly undesirable and is not required by TRIPS. Indeed, a new
use is more in the nature of an idea than an actual new industrial application.
The EAC has directly encouraged its Partner States to exclude patents on
“new medical uses of known substances including micro-organisms … .”10
However, by existing regulation and KIPI Examination Guidelines, new use
patents are considered to be process patents,11 so these provisions should be
amended if the Bill is adopted.
Novelty: Subsection 49(1) has a standard definition of novelty: “An
invention is new if it is not anticipated by prior art.” Kenya appropriately
adopts a global standard of novelty and includes disclosure that is written,
oral, or by use, exhibition of other non-written means (subsection 49(2))
though it also has a twelve-month “grace” period (subsection 29(5)). Kenya
also includes prior disclosed patent applications in its definition of prior art
(subsection 49(4)). This standard is discussed at length in paragraph 6.31 of
the Examination Guidelines, which clarifies that novelty determinations
should not be based on combining separate items of prior art together but that
Novartis AG v. Union of India and Ors, paras. 180, 187 (2013).
The East African Community has also directly recommended that its Partners States “are to exclude
from patentability … Derivative of medical products that do not show significantly enhanced
therapeutic efficacy/significant superior properties.” EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No.
3(a)(iii), at 14.
10 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(a)(ii), at 14. For EAC Partner States seeking to
consider new medical uses principally patentable as processes under the patentability criteria (like
Kenya), the EAC further recommends that they “shall strictly apply the patentability requirements on
a case-by-case basis.” This author thinks it is superior to reject new use patents altogether as India has
done.
11
Legal Notice 50, THE INDUSTRIAL PROPERTY REGULATIONS, 2002, Section 36,
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=128385. See also Kenya Industrial Property Institute,
GUIDELINE FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PATENTS, UTILITY MODELS, AND INDUSTRIAL DESIGNS
[EXAMINATION
GUIDELINES],
para
6.22
(2007),
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/lexdocs/laws/en/ke/ke018en.pdf.
8
9
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the disclosure of prior art can be either explicit or implicit. Limiting prior art
to a single source goes against the recommendation of the EAC, which
recommends that EAC Members “Strictly apply the novelty standard through
considering a wide concept of prior art …, including … information …
derivable from a combination of publications.”12 In addition, Kenya could
reject selection claims on Markush patent applications that cover a broad
range of possible compounds.13 Because the “selected” compounds are in
fact already disclosed in the Markush claim, they can be excluded from
patentability. Alternatively, Kenya could exclude Markush claims as be
overly broad.
Inventive step: Inventive step is often the most important patentability
criteria with respect to medicines and other health technologies. Section 50
of the proposed Bill says: “An invention shall be considered as involving an
inventive step if, having regard to the prior art relevant to the application
claiming the invention, it would not have been obvious to a person skilled in
the art to which the invention pertains on the date of the filing of the
application, or, if priority is claimed, on the priority date validly claimed in
respect thereto.” It is highly desirable to codify high standards for inventive
steps. The Kenyan Examination Guidelines do incorporate relatively high
standards by (1) acknowledging that with respect to “a person skilled in the
art,” “There may be instances where it is more appropriate to think in terms
of a group of persons, e.g., a research or production team, than a single
person” for example, with advance technologies involving complex chemical
substances (Paragraph 6.33.2); (2) simple juxtaposition or aggregation of
known features is not inventive (Paragraph 66.33.5); and (3) it is permissible
to combine the disclosure of one or more documents, parts of documents or
other pieces of prior art, to assess inventive step (Paragraph 6.33.11).
On the negative side, Kenya could assess inventive step by means of a
higher standard – “a person (or groups of persons) highly skilled in the
relevant art(s), including persons with some degree of imagination and
intuition.”14 The EAC specifically recommends that inventive step be defined
by reference to a person “highly” skilled in the arts.15 This definition would
acknowledge the special skills of true experts, the distributed nature of
expertise in modern research ventures, and the growing interdisciplinary of
research. The inventive stop standard could also be strengthened by more
directly acknowledging that prior art can teach indirectly. In addition, there
are several undesirable elements in Kenya’s Examination Guidelines, namely
consideration of long-felt need and commercial success (apparently borrowed
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 2(a), at 13.
“Markush claims are broadly drafted claims covering a family of a large number (sometimes
millions) of possible compounds through the definition of a chemical structure with multiple
functionally equivalent chemical entities allowed in one or more parts of the compound.” Carlos M.
Correa, TACKLING THE PROLIFERATION OF PATENTS: HOW TO AVOID UNDUE LIMITATIONS TO
COMPETITION AND THE PUBLIC DOMAIN, South Centre Research Paper No. 52, at 4 (2014).
14 Correa, GUIDELINES FOR THE EXAMINATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL PATENTS, at 4.
15 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 2(b), at 13.
12
13
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from U.S. law) and the granting of selection patents, which merely serve to
extend patent life for previously disclosed substances.
Industrial applicability: Section 51 of the Bill states that “an invention
shall be considered industrially applicable, if, according to its nature, it can
be made or used in any kind of industry, including agriculture, medicines,
fishery and other services.” This definition is stronger that the concept of
usefulness or utility adopted by some countries. One reason to adopt high
standards of industrial applicability is to ensure that patents are not granted
on abstract ideas that not concretized in actual technological activity.
Another reason is to avoid patents on inventions with only ephemeral utility
is that such patents can block follow-on research by inventors who might
actually find a practice use for a claimed invention. Kenya’s definition of
industrial applicability is relatively strong, but it could be further
strengthened by adopting the recommendation of the EAC that “the
patentability of research tools [be limited] to only those for which a specific
use has been identified.”16
III.

Disclosures

Best mode: The TRIPS Agreement allows countries a great deal of
flexibility with respect to required disclosures. Article 29.1 states that the
applicant may be required “to indicate the best mode for carrying out the
invention known to the inventor.” As an improvement to the 2001 Industrial
Property Act, the proposed Bill, Section 34(5), requires that the description
of the invention in an application for a patent shall “disclose the invention
and the best mode for carrying out the invention in such full, clear, concise
and exact terms as to enable a person skilled in the art to make use and to
evaluated the invention … .” An even better requirement, would compel
disclosure of all known modes for carrying out the invention, including
identification of the best mode, as recommended by the EAC. 17 The failure
to disclose “the best method for performing the invention known to the owner
of the patent at the time when the specification was lodged at the Institute” is
one of the listed grounds for revoking or invalidating a patent in Section
129(3)(g) of the Bill.
Material prior art: The proposed Bill does not currently require the
patent applicant to disclose known prior art. The patent applicant is often in
the best position to ascertain existing art at the time of filing, ordinarily
having done due diligence on freedom to patent prior to filing the patent
application. Capacity-strapped patent examination offices, on the other hand,
often find it onerous, bordering on impossible, to identify all relevant prior
art, disclosed by any means, everywhere in the world. Thus, it makes sense
for patent legislation to impose a duty on patent applicants to disclose
relevant prior art. In an effort to ensure that all relevant prior art is available

16
17

EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 2(c), at 13.
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 7(a), at 17.

BROOK BAKER

PIJIP Research Paper No. 53

8

to its patent examiners, the US Patents and Trademark Office imposes upon
the patent applicant a “duty of candour and good faith in dealing with the
Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the Office all information known
to that individual to be material to patentability.” An intentional failure to
disclose all known material prior art is a “fraud upon the [Patents and
Trademark Office]”, and can result in an invalidation of the patent, and even
triple damages under US antitrust laws.
Disclosure of origin: The proposed Bill does not require disclosure of
the origin of inventions derived from indigenous biological resources, genetic
resources, or traditional knowledge or use, nor does it require disclosure of
means for benefit sharing with respect to the same. Such a disclosure
requirement is permissible under TRIPS18 and has been adopted for example
in South Africa19. Such a provision reduces biopiracy and misappropriation
of traditional knowledge.
Foreign applications: Article 29.2 of the TRIPS Agreement allows
Member States to require disclosure of foreign patent applications for the
same invention and to keep the Member State appraised of subsequent grants,
denials, suspensions, and invalidations. Instead of requiring such disclosure,
Section 64(1) of the proposed Bill merely allows the Managing Office to
request such information. It would be preferable if these disclosures were
mandatory.
International non-proprietary name: Finally, as recently had been
proposed in India and as is recommended by the EAC, Kenya could require
that the patent applicant include the international non-proprietary name for
any pharmaceutical-related invention.20 This would make it much easier to
focus examinations of pharmaceutical patents, particularly with respect to
weak secondary, evergreening patent applications.
Consequences of non-disclosure – revocation:
At present, the
consequences of not disclosing required content under Section 129 of the Bill
is limited to inadequate description of the claim or failure to disclose the best
known method of performing the invention, and misrepresentation (Section
129(3)(f), (g) and (h)). If the additional recommended disclosures discussed
above are added, failure to provide these disclosures should also result in
revocation.
IV.

Limitations and Exceptions

Article 30 of the TRIPS Agreement allows for limited exceptions to
patent rights so long as they “do not unreasonably conflict with a normal
exploitation of the patent and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate
interests of the patent owner, taking account of the legitimate interests of third
18 Carlos Correa & Joshua D.

Sarnoff, ANALYSIS OF OPTIONS FOR IMPLEMENTING DISCLOSURE OF ORIGIN
REQUIREMENTS IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPLICATIONS, 24 (UNCTAD, 2006).
19 South Africa Patents Act, sections 3A and 61(g).
20 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 7(b), at 17.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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parties.” Some of the most important limited exceptions affecting access to
medicines and other health technologies that Kenya should adopt are
discussed below.
Prior use: Section 82 of the Bill provides a limited exception to patent
rights for “prior users” who in good faith had used the invention or was
making effective and serious preparations for such use. This provision might
rarely apply in the pharmaceutical context, but it might at least on occasion
and thus it is a good provision to have in effect and is quite consistent with
state practice elsewhere.
Research exception: Article 84(1) of the Bill creates a limited exception
for non-commercial or non-industrial scientific research. This formulation
does not make full use of the flexibility allows by Article 30 of the TRIPS
Agreement. According to WIPO research, many countries have adopted a
much broader research and education exception that allows both commercial
and non-commercial research “on or with” the patented product or process
and likewise allows for education use as well. The EAC directly recommends
such an approach.21 Allowing commercial research facilitates the process of
incremental innovation that might lead to commercialization, including the
commercialization of dependent technologies. Allowing research with as
well as on the patented subject matter allows the researcher to use patented
upstream research platforms without being bogged down in license
negotiations. In this regard, the EAC recommends that EAC Partner States
patent law “Provide a right to claim a non-exclusive licence for the use of
patented research tools against the payment of compensation.”22 This right
could be automatic.
Early working/Bolar exception: Kenya has an early working/Bolar
exception in Section 80(2) of the Bill.23 However, Kenya’s Bolar provision is
limited in two ways that could be improved. First, it would seem to allow
working the patent for the purpose of registration only within Kenya. Second,
the exception would seem to be valid only when the registrant confirms that
it will not commercialize the registered product until after patent expiration.
TRIPS Article 30 allows research activities and product development
reasonably related to the purpose of registering or obtaining required
marketing approvals for pharmaceuticals and other medical products. For
example, the early working exception allows a producer of medicines to
reverse engineer a medicine, to conduct stability, bioequivalence and other
required tests, to develop proof of manufacturing according to Good
Manufacturing Practice, and thereafter to submit the compiled data to
national drug regulatory authorities for the purpose of obtaining marketing
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 4(a), at 15. The EAC notes that “The preponderant
purpose of commercial research must be the generation of new knowledge of the patented subject.”
22 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 4(b), at 15.
23 “The rights conferred on the owner of the patent under this section shall not apply to acts by third
parties necessary to obtain approval or registration of a product from the Institute, for the purpose of
commercialising the product after expiry of the patent.”
21
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approval. All these activities can occur before the patent expires so that the
generic entrant is in a position to quickly enter the market upon patent expiry,
instead of having to wait two or more years to complete the required research
and product development and then additional years to obtain regulatory
approval. Similarly, if the generic entrant believes that a granted patent on
the medicine is invalid, as a result of a TRIPS-compliant, but best-practice
early working exception, the registrant can immediately enter the market
even before patent expiration. It is important to note that early working rules
can and should allow the use of the patent product or process with respect to
both domestic and foreign registration. This would, for example, facilitate a
local producer being able to expand into regional and foreign markets more
quickly. The EAC firmly recommends the adoption of a broad Bolar
exception.24
Parallel importation: Article 84(2) of the Bill states: “The rights under
the patent shall not extend to acts in respect of articles which have been put
on the market in Kenya or in any other country or imported into Kenya by
the owner of the patent or with his express consent.” This is a very significant
amendment to the provisions of the 2001 Act, which not include the phrase
“by the owner of the patent or with his express consent.” The earlier
provision has a very conflicted history whereby it was initially adopted,
subsequently repealed surreptitiously and then later reinstated.25 That
provision had been further clarified by Clause 37 of the Industrial Property
Regulations of 2002, which provides that: “The limitations of rights under a
patent in section 58(2) of the Act extends to acts in respect of articles that are
imported from a country where the articles were legitimately put on the
market.” The impact of this version of the international exhaustion rule,
recommended by Professor Carlos Correa26 and by the EAC27, is quite
profound. It meant that Kenya will not only be allowed to parallel import any
medicines sold by the originator/patent holder in another country or with its
consent, if it is cost advantageous to do so, it will also be allowed to import
products sold by voluntary or compulsory licensees.

24

In order to allow early market entry for generic producers, EAC Partner States shall amend their
national patent law provisions on marketing approval/‘Bolar’ exception to:
a. Authorise the use of patented substances by interested parties for marketing approvals by
national and foreign medicines regulatory authorities;
b. Clarify the scope of the marketing approval/‘Bolar’ exception to the effect that generic
producers may use patented substances for acts ‘reasonably related’ to the development and
submission of information required for marketing approvals.”
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 5, p. 15-16.
25 The amendment that was inexplicably incorporated into the law would have been the more common
international exhaustion rule that would have added the phrase “by the owner of the patent or with his
express consent.” This would have resulted in a much less robust parallel importation rule that would
have prevented, for example, importation of medicines produced pursuant to a properly issued
compulsory license. For a brief history of this provision, see Lewis-Lettington & Munyi, at 17-20.
26 See Correa, INTEGRATING PUBLIC HEALTH, at 79-80 (admitting that such a rule might be subject to
WTO challenge).
27 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, at 18.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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For reasons that are unclear, the proposed Bill has adopted the more
common, but less permissive international exhaustion/parallel importation
rule, which will therefore require an amendment to the Industrial Property
Regulations of 2002. Although this statutory and regulatory change would
eliminate the risk of a TRIPS compliance challenge, it also means that Kenya
will have fewer options to import generic equivalents lawfully produced
abroad. Accordingly, it might need to increase its use of compulsory or
government use licenses to overcome patent barriers to source medicines.
Unfortunately, foreign compulsory licensees do not have untrammeled rights
to export wherever they want. Article 31(f) of the TRIPS Agreement still
places restrictions on the export of medicines produced pursuant to a
compulsory license, limiting such exports to non-predominant quantities
except with respect to competition-based licenses (see Article 31(k)).
Similarly, parallel exportation/importation will not work automatically with
respect to export licenses granted under the August 30 Decision waiver
mechanism because of requirements about notification and the requirement
of a compulsory license in the importing country if a local patent is in effect
therein.
Other Exceptions: Section 84(3) of the proposed Bill confirms an
exception for the use of patented articles in aircrafts, land vehicles or vessels
of other countries temporarily in the airspace, territory or waters of Kenya.
Section 84(5) clarifies that compulsory licenses for reasons of public interest
or based on interdependence of patents and by the provisions on State
exploitation of patented inventions are exceptions to patent protections.
Finally, Section 84(6) states that patent rights “shall not extend to variants or
mutants of living forms or replicable living matter that is distinctively
different from the original for which patents were obtained where such
mutual or variant are deserving of separate patents.”
V.

Required Patent Examinations

Section 70(3) of the proposed Bill would amend 44(1)(a) of the 2001 Act
to require examination of patent applications.
VI.

Pre- and Post-Grant Oppositions

Post-grant: Kenya’s proposed Bill adopts a form of post-grant opposition
in Section 129(1) of the Bill, which provides that “An interested person may
institute proceedings against the owner of a patent or a registered utility
model or industrial design request[ing] the Tribunal to revoke or invalidate
the [same].” The Bill removes a nine-months limitation requirement in the
2001 Act. This recourse to administrative proceedings is far superior to more
costly and time-consuming judicial resolution, especially where the Tribunal
can develop IP expertise over time.
Pre-grant: Unfortunately, Kenya makes no similar provision for pregrant opposition, though allowing such procedures is somewhat impractical
under current ARIPO procedures, which require notification of nonBROOK BAKER
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acceptance within six months of the grant of an ARIPO patent. Nonetheless,
Kenya could adopt pre-grant opposition procedures and bypass ARIPO
strictures and timelines by automatically denying pharmaceutical (or other)
patents when a pre-grant opposition has been filed. This would provide the
KIPI with plenty of time to carefully consider opposition evidence and
arguments.
Low- and middle-income countries frequently face critical capacity
constraints when examining patent applications, especially in highly
technical fields of technology. If patent examiners are undertrained or
overburdened or if they lack access to prior art databases and other labor
saving information technologies, then the predictable outcome is patents of
poor quality – unwarranted patents that nonetheless grant exclusive rights and
prevent competition. To help alleviate the problem of over-stretched patent
offices and to ensure consideration of all relevant prior art and the correct
application of patent eligibility and disclosure standards, multiple countries,
developed and developing, have allowed pre-grant opposition procedures that
allow presentation of both evidence and legal arguments. The EAC has
recommended that its Partner States provide “for effective pre- and post-grant
administrative patent application procedures” and that they should further, as
ARIPO Members, discuss an amendment to the Harare Protocol “to take
account of third party oppositions” and to allow a longer time within which
to file written approval of ARIPO granted patents.28
An effective pre-grant opposition procedure would:

28



Require publication of pending patent applications prior to
examination and make such applications available online on a
fully searchable database;



Allow for any natural or juristic person, even if acting solely in
the public interest, to file a pre-grant opposition at any time after
publication of the patent application but prior to the grant of a
patent, with ample time for opponents to submit relevant
evidence;



Establish broad grounds for opposition including a failure to meet
patentable subject matter, exclusion, or patentability criteria and
failure to make required disclosures;



Opponents should be given full legal standing and they should be
able to appear at a hearing in support of their opposition if such
hearings are provided for;



The pre-grant opposition procedure should allow simple and
expedited administrative procedures.

EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, supra note 5, Policy Statement No. 8.
WWW.WCL.AMERICAN.EDU/PIJIP
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VII.

Compulsory licenses and government use

Compulsory licenses: As clarified by the Doha Declaration, WTO
Members have complete freedom to determine the grounds upon which
compulsory licenses may be granted. There are no disease restrictions,
country-status restrictions, or field of technology restrictions. The Paris
Convention29 does place some limits on the timing of compulsory licenses for
non-working, but otherwise countries have near total discretion to define
permitted grounds for issuing compulsory licenses. As a general rule,
countries are far better off articulating multiple and broad grounds for
compulsory licenses instead of restricted grounds.30 After all, a patent is a
sovereign grant of exclusive, i.e., monopoly, rights and the patentee takes
such rights with full notice of possibility that the granting government might
issue compulsory and government-use licenses. Countries should retain
maximum policy space for the exercise of government discretion about the
myriad circumstances where involuntary use should be permitted to
safeguard public interests.
Kenya’s proposed IP Bill regulates the granting of compulsory licenses
in sections 97-78 of the Bill. Sections 97 and 98 provide regrettably limited
grounds for granting a patent, that must be improved. Section 97(1) provides
for compulsory licenses when the patented invention “is not being supplied
on reasonable terms to Kenya,” but the applicant must wait four years from
the date of application or three years from the grant of the patent, whichever
is later, before seeking a compulsory license. This waiting period is enacted
in part to comply with Article 5A(4) of the Paris Convention for the
Protection of Industrial Property, which technically applies only in the case
of failure to work or insufficient working. However, the Kenyan provision
is broader by virtue of requiring supply on reasonable terms, but it also
needlessly requires an over-long waiting period whenever the patented
invention is not being supplied on reasonable terms even though it is being
worked in Kenya, e.g., when prices are excessive, where there are refusals to
license, etc. Section 98(1) of the Bill is also unnecessarily limited in that it
applies only to the granting of dependent patents – patents needed to work a
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883 as amended through 1979), Article
5A(4), “A compulsory license may not be applied for on the ground of failure to work or insufficient
working before the expiration of a period of four years from the date of filing of the patent application
or three years from the date of the grant of the patent, whichever period expires last; it shall be refused
if the patentee justifies his inaction by legitimate reasons. Such a compulsory license shall be nonexclusive and shall not be transferable, even in the form of the grant of a sub-license, except with that
part of the enterprise or goodwill which exploits such license.”
Available at
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/text.jsp?file_id=288514.
30 Brook K. Baker, PROCESSES AND ISSUES FOR IMPROVING ACCESS TO MEDICINES: WILLINGNESS AND
ABILITY TO UTILIZE TRIPS FLEXIBILITIES IN NON-PRODUCING COUNTRIES, UK DFID, Health Systems
Resource Centre (2004); Cecilia Oh, Compulsory licenses: recent experiences in developing countries,
1 INT’L J. INTELLECTUAL PROP. 22-36 (2006); Jerome H. Reichman & Catherine Hasenzahl, NONVOLUNTARY LICENSING OF PATENTED INVENTIONS: HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE, LEGAL FRAMEWORK
UNDER TRIPS, AND AN OVERVIEW OF THE PRACTICE IN CANADA AND THE USA (2003); Reed Beall &
Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since the Doha Declaration: A
Database Analysis, 9:1 PLOS MED e1001154 (2012).
29
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new invention that constitutes an important technical advance of considerable
economic significance in relation to the invention claimed in the earlier
patent. This dependent-patent exception is directly authorized by TRIPS
Article 31(l). However, there is nothing in TRIPS that prohibits a compulsory
license for the working of a dependent technology even if that technology is
not patented.
The permissible grounds for compulsory licensing in Kenya is capable of
broad interpretation, but could still be improved. As stated above, the Doha
Declaration reaffirms that countries are free to determine the grounds upon
which licenses might be granted.31 This freedom further emphasized by the
EAC.32 Common grounds include unreasonable pricing, emergencies and
matters of extreme urgency, and refusals to license. However, it is highly
desirable to list addition specific grounds, e.g., to prevent the risk of stockouts, to promote the development and marketing of rational fixed-dose
combinations, and to protect public health and the public interest more
broadly. Indeed, although this proposition is not without some controversy,33
there is scope under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement to permit compulsory
licenses for failure to work the patented invention locally within Kenya by
manufacturing or using the process in Kenya,34 much as both Brazil and India
have done. The Paris Convention in Article 5A(2) directly authorizes
countries of the Union to provide for compulsory licenses in case of failure
by the patentee to work the patent locally (e.g. to produce locally, rather than
merely import). Such a provision as this would certainly be a boon to local
and regional production of medicines.
Similarly, Kenya should provide for competition-based compulsory
licenses as recommended by the EAC.35 It has done so with respect to
government use licenses (Section 105(1)(b)), but it could also do so for
revised Section 97 licenses. If it does so, it should take advantage of
additional flexibilities removing the requirement of prior negotiation and
limits of quantities exported (TRIPS Article 31(k)). In order to speed up its
access to medicines even in the pre-grant stage where a pending patent can
operated as a de facto patent in terms of deterring competition, Kenya should
provide for tentative or provisional compulsory licenses on medicines with
pending patents and when denied patents are under appeal. These licenses
Doha Declaration, para. 5(b), “Each member has the right to grant compulsory licences and the
freedom to determine the grounds upon which such licences are granted.”
32 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(a), at 20.
33 Those who argue against the legality of local working requirements often point to Article 27.1 of the
TRIPS Agreement which prohibits discrimination against imports in the granting patents available or
enjoyment of patent rights.
34 Michael Halewood, Regulating Patent Holders: Local Working Requirement and Compulsory
Licenses at International Law, 35 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 243-287 (1997); Bryan Mercuriio & Mitali
Tyagi, Treaty Interpretation in WTO Dispute Settlement: The Outstanding Question of the Legality of
Local Working Requirements, 19 MINN. J. INT’L L. 275-326 (2010); Chia-Ling Lee, The Legality of
Local Patent Working Requirements under the TRIPS Agreement, 2 N.T.U.T. J. of Intell. Prop. L. &
Mgmt. 39-48 (2013); Paul Champ and Amir Attaran, Patent Rights and Local Working Under the WTO
TRIPS Agreement: An Analysis of the Brazil Patent Dispute, 27 YALE J. INT’L L. 365-293 (2002).
35 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 11(b), at 21.
31
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could be royalty free with a catch-up payment if the patent is ultimately
granted. Finally, Kenya could take the bold step of allowing compulsory
licenses for know-how. In many instances, a patent can best be
operationalized only via access to otherwise trade-secret know-how. Based
on additional compensation a license could be imposed granting involuntary
access to the same.36
Kenya has comprehensively incorporated the required procedures of the
TRIPS compulsory licenses in the proposed Bill. Nonetheless, there are other
elements of the compulsory licensing regime that could be improved. For
example, Kenya should directly reference the right to supply a compulsory
license via importation. With a wise amendment to the 2001 Act, Kenya has
explicitly waived the requirement for prior negotiation in cases of national
emergency or other circumstances of extreme urgency regardless of whether
the license is premised initially on non-working under section 99(2) of the
proposed Bill as recommended by the EAC.37 To speed up the issuance of
compulsory licenses it could specify the minimum time period for prior
negotiation for a voluntary license on commercially reasonable terms, e.g.,
the 90-days only recommended by the EAC.38 Kenya could also follow the
best practice recommendation that it set remuneration guidelines to simplify
the determination of adequate remuneration.39 In this regard, the EAC has
recommended that Partner States shall “include in their patent laws a
provision statement stating that the remuneration shall not exceed the UNDP
recommended figure of 4%, and take anti-competitive behaviour into account
when determining the amount of remuneration.”40
Article 31bis licenses: A fundamental flaw in the Article 31(f) of the
TRIPS Agreement is that it limits exportation of goods produced pursuant to
a compulsory licenses to non-predominate quantities. This provision creates
a serious disadvantage for countries that have insufficient capacity to
manufacturer medicines locally or where it is inefficient to do so, and who
must therefore rely on imports. In such instances, governments could issue
an “ordinary” compulsory license to a foreign company, but, if there were
also an applicable patent in the country of production/export, then a
compulsory license would have to be issued in that country as well. The
Article 31(f) paradox is that the licensed exporting company might not be
able to export sufficient quantities to fulfill foreign needs because of the
“predominately for domestic use” rule.
The drafters of the Doha Declaration recognized this dilemma and
instructed the WTO to devise an expeditious decision in paragraph 6 of the
Max Planck Institute, DECLARATION ON PATENT PROTECTION: REGULATORY SOVEREIGNTY UNDER
TRIPS, at 11 (2014), available at http://www.mpg.de/8133454/Patent-Declaration1.pdf.
37 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(g), at 20.
38 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(f), at 20.
39 See James Love, REMUNERATION GUIDELINES FOR NON-VOLUNTARY USE OF A PATENT ON MEDICAL
TECHNOLOGIES, UNDP and WHO (2005) at pp. 67–76 for a comprehensive review of proposed
remuneration guidelines.
40 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(e), at 20.
36
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Declaration. Belatedly, on 30 August 2003 the WTO General Council issued
a decision declaring a waiver from Article 31(f), the so-called Paragraph 6
Decision.41 After long delays, the TRIPS Agreement is now amended to add
Article 31bis now codifying the earlier Decision. Unfortunately, Article 31bis
imposes considerable procedural requirements on both importing and
exporting countries issuing compulsory licenses and further restricts the
quantity of pharmaceutical products that might be exported. These
procedural requirements have been called “labyrinth”42 and as being “neither
expeditious, nor a solution.”43 Nonetheless, Kenya should amend its
compulsory licensing regime to allow use of Article 31bis as both an
importing and exporting country. The EAC has certainly recommended that
Partner States do so.44 In doing so, it should follow innovative suggestions
for simplifying domestic implementation of the Article 31bis, including a socalled one-license solution that was proposed in Canada but allowed to lapse
in Parliament.45
Government use: Kenya has adopted a much more progressive grounds
allowing for government use. The grounds articulated in Section 105(1)(a)
are quite broad, including the “public interest” generally and more
particularly “national security, nutrition, health, environmental conservation,
or the development of any other vital sector of the national economy.”
Section 105(1)(b) also allows government use licenses where the Director
General determines that the manner of exploiting the patent is not
competitive. The government use can be ordered “by the Cabinet Secretary”
and shall allow exploitation of the protected invention by a Government
Ministry, Department, agency or other person (Section 105(1)). The
Procedures for issuing a government-use order are clarified in Regulation 43
of the Industrial Property Regulations, namely a request that the Minister act.

Decision of the General Council of 30 August 2003, Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha
Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/L/540 and Corr.1, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm. The “temporary waiver” of the
Decision was made into a permanent proposed amendment to TRIPS in December 2005, under a new
Article 31bis, available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm. The amendment
will become part of TRIPS only upon ratification by at least two-thirds of the WTO members. At
present, less than half of all WTO members had ratified the amendment.
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm.
42 Brook K. Baker, Arthritic Flexibilities for Accessing Medicines, Analysis of WTO Action Regarding
Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, 14 IND. INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 613-715 (2004); Frederick M. Abbott & Jerome H. Reichman, The Doha Round’s Public
Health Legacy: Strategies for the Production and Diffusion of Patented Medicines under the Amended
TRIPS Provision, 10 J. INT’L ECON. L. 921-987 (2007); Frederick M. Abbott, The WTO Medicines
Decision: World Pharmaceutical Trade and the Protection of Public Health, 99 AM. J. INT’L L 317
(2005).
43 Medecins Sans Frontieres Canada, NEITHER EXPEDITIOUS, NOR A SOLUTION: THE WTO AUGUST 30
DECISION IS UNWORKABLE, 2 (2006).
44 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, supra note 5, Policy Statement No. 10(b)-(d), at 20.
45 Richard Elliott, Fixing Canada’s Access to Medicines Regime – Bill C-398, IP-WATCH (18 Nov.
2012), available at http://www.ip-watch.org/2012/11/18/fixing-canadas-access-to-medicines-regimebill-c-398/;
Bill
C-398
available
at
http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&Mode=1&DocId=5391829
&File=4.
41
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Government use explicitly allows for satisfaction by importation as well
as by local production (Section 105(2)). There are conflicting provisions on
adequate remuneration. Subsections 105(1) and (8) require adequate
compensation whereas Subsections 105(3) and (4) do not require payment of
compensation, which would run afoul of the adequate remuneration
requirements of Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
The Bill could be improved if it clarified that the Department could act
sua sponte to allow use by or for the government. The United States has an
extremely liberal government use provision requiring no formalities
whatsoever. Section 105 of the Bill requires prior negotiation with the patent
owner for a contractual license except in the case of national emergency or
other extreme urgency. The requirement of prior negotiations for government
use license is clearly TRIPS-plus and should be rejected. Governments are
not required by TRIPS Article 31 to consult with patent owners for public,
non-commercial use let alone try to negotiate a contractual license allowing
government use. Likewise, the Bill fails to provide for remuneration
guidelines, as discussed above, and it fails to exclude injunctive relief as a
remedy with respect to government use licenses as recommended by the
EAC.46 Finally, it would be preferable if Section 105 more directly referenced
that the government use were for “public, non-commercial use” as specified
in Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement.
VIII.

Regulation of contractual licenses:

WTO Member States are fully empowered under international law to
closely regulate the terms of intellectual property licenses to prevent
anticompetitive terms. TRIPS Article 8(2) clarifies that: “Appropriate
measures, provided they are consistent with the provisions of this Agreement,
may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right
holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain trade or
adversely affect the international transfer of technology.” More particularly,
TRIPS Article 40.2 states that Members may specify in their domestic laws
licensing practices or conditions "that may in particular cases constitute an
abuse of intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition
in the relevant market." It also specifies some presumptively anticompetitive practices.47 The East Africa Community directs its Partner States
46
47

EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 10(h), at 20.
TRIPS Article 40:
1. Members agree that some licensing practices or conditions pertaining to intellectual property
rights which restrain competition may have adverse effects on trade and may impede the
transfer and dissemination of technology.
2. Nothing in this Agreement shall prevent Members from specifying in their legislation
licensing practices or conditions that may in particular cases constitute an abuse of
intellectual property rights having an adverse effect on competition in the relevant market.
As provided above, a Member may adopt, consistently with the other provisions of this
Agreement, appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices, which may include
for example exclusive grantback conditions, conditions preventing challenges to validity and
coercive package licensing, in the light of the relevant laws and regulations of that Member.
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to prevent anti-competitive behavior and to list licensing terms that may be
considered unjustified restrictions on competition and authorize patent
registrars to refuse to register such licensing contracts.48
Kenya has adopted extensive rules regulating contractual licenses in
Sections 90-96 of the Bill. Contractual terms prohibited are listed in Section
94 of the Bill. Section 94’s general prohibition is against clauses that impose
unjustified restriction on the licensee with the consequence that the contract,
taken as a whole, is harmful to the economic interest of Kenya, if those
clauses also require, among others: (i) importation of technologies obtainable
on the same terms within Kenya, (ii) disproportion prices or royalties
compared to the value of the technology, (iii) acquisition of materials from
the licensor or other limited source other than to ensure quality, (iv) limits on
eligible buyers, (v) grant back rights without consideration, (vi) volume
limitation and exports prohibitions, (vii) prohibitions on use of other
technologies, (viii) fixed prices, (ix) waivers of liability, (x) restricted use
after the expiration of the contract, (xi) choice of non-Kenya law, (xii)
unreasonably long periods, (xiii) non-adaptation to local conditions, (xiv)
mandatory tie-ins or requirements to accept additional technologies and
future improvements, and/or many other prohibited conditions including
royalties on patents outside of Kenya (double royalties). At this point, it
would be better for Kenya to actually enforce its supervision of contractual
licenses rather than to seek amendment to its current comprehensive rules.
IX.

Enforcement

Injunctions: In terms of enforcing patent rights, Section 81(1)(a) of the
Bill allows patent holders to obtain injunctions to restrain patent infringement
and Section 132(a) states that the Tribunal “shall grant … an injunction to
prevent infringement where infringement is imminent or to prohibit the
continuation of the infringement, once infringement has started,” whereas
Article 44 of the TRIPS Agreement allows countries freedom to allow
compensation only – essentially a judicially issued license.49 Such an
allowance has been used in the United States50 and in India51.
Provisional Protection: Section 77 the Bill grants TRIPS plus rights to
claim compensation for offending acts during the pendency of the application
EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 11(a), at 20-21.
The legality of such a limitation on injunctive and provisional relief under TRIPS is clarified by
Article 44.2 of the TRIPS Agreement, “In other cases, the remedies under this Part shall apply or, where
these remedies are inconsistent with a Member’s law, declaratory judgments and adequate
compensation shall be available (emphasis added).”
50 eBay, Inc., v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
51 See Hoffman La Roche v. Cipla & Anr, IA No. 642/2008 in CS (OS) No.89/2008. The refusal to
grant a preliminary injunction was vindicated by an eventual trial on the merits in 2012 where it was
found that Cipla had not in fact violated the patent at issue. Elsewhere, the Supreme Court of Appeal
in South Africa has recently ruled that the impact on a temporary injunction on the public interest
should be weighed before entering such an order, but on the merits of the case rejected awarding a
royalty and instead awarded the temporary order. Cipla Medpro v. Aventis Pharma; Aventis Pharma
SA v. Cipla Life Sciences [2012] ZASCA 108 (26 July 2012).
48
49
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for a patent, if the application has been published in English under the Patent
Cooperation Treaty or if the offender received written notice in English about
the published application. This provision requires compensation even with
respect to a patent application that is subsequently denied with no subsequent
recourse against the unsuccessful patent applicant. This provision is TRIPSplus and should be rejected. Section 81 of the Bill also allows compensation
for infringement following publication of an application, as if the patent had
been granted where the alleged infringer had actual knowledge that the
invention he was using was the subject matter of a published application or
he had received written notice of the same.
Criminal enforcement: In addition to unnecessarily requiring injunctions,
the Bill in Section 135 undesirably provides for criminal sanctions for
intention violations of patents, utility models, or industrial designs, including
up to five years of imprisonment. The TRIPS Agreement does not require
criminal enforcement of IP rights, except in the narrow context of criminal
trademark infringement and copyright piracy on a commercial scale.52
Whether a patent right is violated by a particular act is often a question of
refined judicial interpretation. Producers of alleged patent infringing
products might well assume that their acts will not be infringing, they may be
ignorant of the patent claim in issue, or they may sincerely believe that the
asserted patent is invalid and that they would win any infringement case. In
the face of inherent uncertainty about patent validity and enforceability and
in light of the negative impact of criminal sanctions on innovation activity, it
is simply inappropriate to impose criminal liability on a party for infringing
a patent,53 especially because other remedies are available including damages
and in extraordinary cases injunctive relief. This provision should be
rejected.
X.

Utility Models

Utility models are essentially lesser patents on minor innovations that fall
short of meeting patentability criteria, usually novelty or inventive step. In
addition to having lesser standards, utility model systems, including Kenya’s,
typically do not require substantive examination of the merits of the
application.54 Under Article 107(1) of its Bill, Kenya legislates that “An
invention qualifies for a utility model certificate if it is new and industrially
applicable.” This Review concludes that Kenya should deny utility models

52 Article

61.
See, Irina C. Manta, The Puzzle of Criminal Sanctions for Intellectual Property Infringement, 24
HARVARD J. LAW & TECH. 469-518 (2011); Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Innovation
and Incarceration: An Economic Analysis of Criminal Intellectual Property, 87 S. CAL. L. REV. 275334 (2014) (“According to our analysis, there is a limited and tentative case for the use of criminal
liability, including imprisonment and alternative sanctions, for only some types of copyright
infringement—and none at all for patent infringement”); Max Planck Institute, DECLARATION ON
PATENT PROTECTION, at 12.
54 Uma Suthersanen, UTILITY MODELS AND INNOVATION IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, UNCTAD-ICTSD
(2006); Draft Amended Patents Act, Article 101.
53
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on pharmaceuticals.55
The vast majority of utility models on
pharmaceuticals, including biodiversity-based and traditional-knowledgebased medicines, are likely be filed by foreign pharmaceutical companies.
Accordingly, utility models based on minor variations in formulations,
dosages, or chemical form, instead of aiding local pharmaceutical
manufacture, would serve instead primarily to delay generic competition and
to raise the cost of needed medicines. Because the TRIPS Agreement does
not require utility models, it is possible to distinguish between fields of
technologies therein. Although the EAC does not go so far as to recommend
that there not be any protection for small-scale innovations, it suggests that
the protection be in the form of a right to compensation rather than via
exclusive rights.56
CONCLUSION
Although there are many positive elements in patent sections of the
proposed Intellectual Property Bill, 2020, there are many additional TRIPScompliant provisions that should be included. There is little point in
recodifying existing law, only to fall short in adopting provisions that can go
as far as legally permissible to ensure increased access to affordable health
products in Kenya, especially as it faces the COVID-19 pandemic. The
recommended additions and changes are neither radical nor controversial.
They are common sense adjustments that will help conserve public and
private resources while limiting or curtailing excessive monopoly control by
multinational biopharmaceutical companies over life-saving medicines.

“The utility model law should comprise a detailed list of excluded subject matter which must mirror
the exclusions under the patent law. Moreover, it is worth considering excluding some types of
invention as dictated by public policy such as chemicals or pharmaceuticals or biological material or
substances or processes.” Suthersanen, at 38. Japan, Korea, and Italy among others exclude utility
models on chemical compositions and/or pharmaceuticals directly.
56 EAC REGIONAL IP POLICY, Policy Statement No. 3(b), at 14.
55
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